The point of Hofstadter’s distinction between ‘What would it be like for me to be X’ and ‘What is it like, objectively, to be X’ is based on the observation, which he formulates as a question, of ‘How can something be something that it isn’t?’ (Hofstadter 1981, 409). This question is deepened by the other fact that both these two ‘things’ can have experience (Hofstadter 1981, 409). And then, he continues by offering, perhaps, the final blow, by bringing a third party into the equation: Like for whom? (Hofstadter 1981, 409). Is it for us, the perceivers, or, again ‘objectively’?
According to Hofstadter this is the ‘sticking’ point of Nagel’s article (Nagel wants to know if it is possible to give a description of the real nature of human experience in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine what it was like to be us.). Hofstadter says that this is ‘a blatant contradiction’ (Hofstadter 1981, 409). It seems that no one can know objectively what it is subjectively like (Hofstadter 1981, 409).
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Tags: Hofstadter, Nagel, Identity, History, Person